On the all-or-none rule of conscious perception by Talis Bachmann
OPINION ARTICLE
published: 19 July 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00387
On the all-or-none rule of conscious perception
Talis Bachmann*
Institute of Public Law and Institute of Psychology, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
*Correspondence: talis.bachmann@ut.ee
Edited by:
Josef Parvizi, Stanford School of Medicine, USA
Reviewed by:
Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Monash University, Australia
Krithiga Sekar, New York University School of Medicine, USA
What are the true functional under-
pinnings of perception, emotion, con-
sciousness, and subconscious processes
remains an unsolved question (Alivisatos
et al., 2012). For example, it seems some-
what mysterious how one and the same
structure of neural circuits—the human
brain—sometimes allows conscious expe-
rience and sometimes does not allow it. We
even do not know whether this owes to the
alternating activity of different circuits, the
change in the activity of the same circuits,
or both.
Nobody denies accumulation of perti-
nent data on where and how the changes
in neural activity correlate with conscious
experience. For instance, specific and non-
specific thalamocortical systems provide
circuits for representing the contents and
guaranteeing the state of consciousness
(Ribary, 2005; Liu et al., 2013), processes
in the higher level sensory-perceptual cor-
tical areas tend to correlate with awareness
more than the processes in the primary
areas (Logothetis et al., 1996; Hesselmann
et al., 2011), reentrant activity from higher
to lower level nodes seems to constitute a
typical feature of circuits involved in con-
scious perception (Lamme, 2010), etc. Yet,
many principal questions have remained
without answers. For example, we do not
know whether conscious experience of a
stimulus is a gradually emerging attribute
of the activity of the corresponding neu-
ral circuits or is it an effect appearing
abruptly as soon as a corresponding neural
marker appears. Recently, a notable study
was published trying to shed light on this
unsolved problem (Sekar et al., 2013).
Sekar et al. (2013) recorded neuro-
magnetic responses in temporoparietal
channels and found that the MEG
response peaking about 240 milliseconds
(ms) after stimulus reliably discriminated
trials with stimulus awareness from trials
lacking stimulus awareness. Importantly,
this MEG-marker was expressed with
an equal magnitude across trials where
subjects reported different subjective
gradations of stimulus experience, but
was decreased when no awareness was
reported. Conscious experience was inter-
preted as emerging according to the all
or none, rule. The different subjective
gradations used for sampling the tri-
als for comparative event-related fields
(ERF) analysis were “didn’t see” for the
unaware condition and “couldn’t iden-
tify,” “unsure,” and “sure” for the three
conditions with changing awareness lev-
els. Several features of this work make it a
landmark contribution to the research on
neural correlates of consciousness (NCC).
A confound between physical variabil-
ity of stimulation and the putative NCC-
markers has been a typical obstacle for
obtaining clearcut information on NCC
(Bachmann, 2009). Sekar et al. (2013)
kept threshold-level stimulation invariant
and measured variable MEG responses
as a correlate of the varying subjective
responses, avoiding co-variation between
the effects of varying physical stimula-
tion and brain processes underlying sub-
jective phenomena. Furthermore, while in
the majority of earlier research on NCC
objective categorical responses have been
used as the dependent measure, graded
subjective responses in addition to objec-
tive discrimination measures were used
(Sekar et al., 2013). Obviously, temporal
resolution of the brain-imaging methods
suitable for studying the fast formation
of conscious perception should be com-
patible with the corresponding fast brain
processes; on the other hand, to under-
stand the precise brain circuits involved in
producing conscious perception, imaging
should enable 3D analysis. In the majority
of earlier research on NCC the recording
methods have been either slow (fMRI,
PET) or fast but controversial in terms
of source analysis (EEG). Furthermore,
recently it was shown that subjective expe-
rience of a stimulus can vary between
“seen” and “unseen” while fMRI recording
data could not differentiate between these
two alternative conditions (Schoenfeld
et al., 2011). Using MEG (Sekar et al.,
2013) these limitations were surpassed at
once. Yet, in spite of these advantages Sekar
et al. paper cannot be conclusive in settling
the issue about graduality vs. “quantal step
like” nature of conscious perception.
(1) Because MEG recording critically
depends on synchrony of (dendritic) neu-
ral activity, the accounts of conscious-
ness mechanisms requiring no synchrony
for NCC and the corresponding recording
methods may suggest different solutions
(He and Raichle, 2009). (2) Whether tran-
sition between states is instantaneous or
gradual (“quantal” vs. “wave-like”) may
depend on the time scale considered. The
cellular and sub-cellular level processes
responsible for awareness may lead to
a gradual change of state (e.g., mem-
brane potential) occurring at the millisec-
ond time-scale although this may appear
“instantaneous” if looked at from the
timescale where the unit time is sev-
eral orders higher. Although the peaks
of MEG-responses indicative of stimu-
lus awareness were statistically invariant
(Sekar et al., 2013), the pre-peak ascending
phase of the response was gradual cover-
ing about 50–100ms. Even though supra-
threshold stimulus-awareness may be all
or none, the formation of the contents
of a conscious percept may be gradual,
albeit very fast. (3) Because MEG data
was collected for parieto-temporal areas
and analogous data about occipital sources
were not reported (Sekar et al., 2013) we
do not know whether earlier responses in
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occipital sources also would have shown
analogous results. Moreover, it is uncertain
whether we deal with true NCC or with
markers of activity of themechanisms con-
trolling response choice or their top-down
effects. Circuits located more dorsally are
more access- and control-related com-
pared to the temporal and occipital circuits
that are more perceptual content related.
A recently suggested (Aru et al., 2012; de
Graaf et al., 2012) requirement to differ-
entiate processes that are prerequisite for
NCC, aftereffects of NCC, and true NCC
was not followed by Sekar et al. (2013). (4)
According to this study the earliest marker
of the varying awareness appears at 240ms
post stimulus. However, peak latency need
not be the only viable indicator of the
process we are interested in. Instead, ERF
deviation change (e.g., some critical value
of derivatives of wave function) or some
characteristic of ERF function’s envelope
spanning a time epoch inclusive of shorter
delays (compared to peak delay) may show
a different time-course. Moreover, when
a stimulus with its energy at discrimi-
nation threshold is used, the process of
percept formation typically unfolding at
a faster rate may be considerably pro-
longed and the estimates of the fastest
times with which a stimulus can reach con-
sciousness become too much conservative.
Thus, instead of the 240ms, about 150ms
would be a correct value for the fastest
delay of visual awareness. (For example,
with suprathreshold, high contrast targets
backward masking disappears when mask
is delayed by 150ms or more—Bachmann,
1994.) (5) Although statistical analysis on
the ERF peak amplitude values of the com-
ponent delayed by 240ms showed no dif-
ference between three subjective awareness
conditions, visual inspection of the cor-
responding magnetic flux data (Figure 4,
Sekar et al., 2013) showed a systematic
increase with increasing subjective esti-
mates of the experienced contents. Thus,
with more measurements statistically sig-
nificant results indicative of the grad-
ual change of ERF peak values could be
obtained in principle.
Notwithstanding the debatable aspects
of the Sekar et al. (2013) work, it seems
a contribution providing standards for
the researchers who aim at finding how
neural circuits help make the processed
perceptual data consciously experienced.
Invariance of physical stimulation com-
bined with variability of subjective mea-
sures, using a gradual scale of subjective
measurement, and using recording and
analysis methods allowing location of the
circuits of interest in 3D are among the
prime requirements. Of course, not all
landmark publications must carry ulti-
mate truths, but they at least show how
research on NCC should be conducted in
a methodologically rigorous way.
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